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Human to human transmission of H7N9
Limited transmission between humans is not surprising
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Since the new avian influenza virus, H7N9, first emerged in
China, a primary concern has been whether it might spread
between humans. The vast majority of the 133 confirmed cases
reported so far seem to be epidemiologically unconnected, with
many patients reporting a recent history of exposure to live
poultry, which are suspected to be a main reservoir for the virus.
Although an earlier study did report two family clusters of H7N9
cases, it was unclear whether these clusters resulted from person
to person transmission or simply from exposure to a common
animal source of infection.1
In the linked paper (doi:10.1136/bmj.f4752) by Qi and
colleagues, a detailed investigation into one of these clusters
provides the strongest evidence yet of H7N9 transmission
between humans.2 The index case, a 60 year old man, was likely
to have been infected at a nearby live poultry market, and
subsequently developed a severe and ultimately fatal respiratory
illness. His 32 year old daughter, who provided prolonged
bedside care for her father before his admission to intensive
care, later also became fatally infected. With no indication that
the daughter was exposed to live poultry within the days before
becoming sick, along with almost 100% genetic similarity
between the viruses isolated from each patient, the evidence
points to transmission from father to daughter.
As the authors acknowledge, there are some limitations to the
study but, on balance, human to human transmission looks
probable. So does this imply that H7N9 has come one step closer
towards adapting fully to humans? Probably not. Crucially,
there is still no evidence of sustained transmission among
humans—all 43 close contacts of these two patients, including
a son in law who also helped care for the father, tested negative
for infection. In addition, the receptor binding sites of the viruses
from the two patients are no more adapted towards humans than
those of other available H7N9 isolates. In many ways, the
evidence corroborates, rather than challenges, previous
assertions that the transmissibility of H7N9 between humans is
currently low.
Indeed, the occasional transmission event from human to human
appears to be the norm rather than the exception for influenza
viruses that sporadically cross the species barrier into humans.
Limited human to human transmission has been reported for
highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1,3 4 which continues to
cause (usually fatal) infections in humans, as well as another
bird flu subtype, H7N7, which caused an outbreak of mostly
mild infections in the Netherlands in 2003.5 To observe some
transmission of H7N9 from human to human is therefore not
surprising, and does not necessarily indicate that the virus is on
course to develop sustained transmission among humans.
Nevertheless, several traits of H7N9 are of particular concern.
The linked paper2 comes close on the heels of studies showing
airborne transmissibility of H7N9 between ferrets in the
laboratory, a mammalian model.6 7 Also, it is now well
documented that owing to its non-lethality in birds, H7N9 can
spread undetected through avian populations. In addition,
Chinese surveillance data suggest that the number of confirmed
human cases is just the tip of the iceberg—many mild cases are
likely to have passed undetected.8 The upside of this is that the
actual fatality rate among H7N9 cases is likely to be
substantially lower than that observed among confirmed cases.9
The flipside is that the incidence of human infections, and
therefore opportunities for H7N9 to adapt to humans or to
re-assort through mixed influenza infections, could be much
greater than for other bird flu viruses such as H5N1.
Although the number of H7N9 cases has fallen abruptly since
April 2013, with no new cases reported for several weeks, we
have been warned to expect a resurgence later in the year owing
to seasonal effects on transmission.10 Thus, while the paper by
Qi and colleagues2 might not suggest that H7N9 is any closer
to delivering the next pandemic, it does provide a timely
reminder of the need to remain extremely vigilant: the threat
posed by H7N9 has by no means passed.
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